When selling a product line a firm has to consider the costs of communicating about the different products to the consumers. This may affect the product line design in general, and which products or services are offered, in particular. The problem is that firms have to communicate to consumers, possibly through advertising, in order to make them consider buying the products that firms are selling. This results in the firm offering a smaller number of products than the optimal number of products when advertising is costless. This effect is greater the greater the extent of consumer confusion about the advertising messages, and is reduced by a greater ability to target advertising.
Introduction
When selling a product line a firm has to consider the costs of communicating about the different products to the consumers. This may affect the product line design in general, and which products or services to be offered, in particular. In this sense firms have sometimes the preference not to offer many products in order not to confuse the consumers. For example, automobile manufacturers offer a limited number of models or brands, 1 manufacturers of consumer products offer a limited number of brands or packages, banks offer only a few types of checking accounts and not a continuum of them. 2 Firms have to communicate to consumers, possibly through advertising, in order to make them consider buying the products that the firms are selling. 3 If firms invest in advertising more products they offer a better fit of each product to the consumer preferences, and can charge higher prices.
However, advertising more products is costly and may result in consumers receiving advertising messages on more that one product, which could generate confusion. As noted by Wells et al. (1992, p. 247) : "An important requirement of informational advertising is that the explanation be clear and relevant to the prospect. Consumers have little patience with ads that are confusing, vague, or unfocused."
As noted in Kotler (1997) when deciding to have a marketing program for a particular segment a company has to make sure that that the "segment should be the largest possible homogeneous group worth going after with a tailored marketing program" (p. 269). The firm can decide between "undifferentiated marketing", where there is a single marketing program for all the market segments, and "differentiated marketing" where there are different marketing programs. The extent to which a segment is "accessible" (i.e., the ability to target it with a particular marketing program) is an important factor in deciding whether to use "differentiated marketing." Similarly, the decision of a company of how many brands to have "involves gauging the trade-off between the value that the brand might create and the cost that it might incur" (Aaker, 1996, p. 264) . And firms make different choices. For example, General Motors has more than thirty brands or sub-brands (e.g., under Buick, Roadmaster, Park Avenue, Riviera) while BMW or Mercedes basically each have one brand, with the models indicated by numbers (e.g., the BMW 700 series). At 3M the criterion for a new brand is that the segment of that brand be large enough to support the necessary brand-building investment (Aaker, 1996) . Similarly, one has to worry about how new brands may affect the sales of existing 1 Sometimes, when including the different potential options one can have a large number of combinations. However, the combinations are all along particular quality dimensions.
2 One academic researcher in the beginning of her career did not want to circulate a paper outside her main area of research, in order not to confuse the market about her positioning. Communicating about this new area with only one paper would take effort without helping much in what the market considered her main area of research.
3 By "consumers considering buying a product" we mean that the consumers have that product in their consideration set. For evidence that consumers do not consider buying all products available, and that there may be substantial heterogeneity in the products being considered see, for example, Newman and Staelin (1972) and Mehta et al. (2003) .
brands and the interaction between the brands or products (e.g., Urban, 1969 , Dobson and Kalish, 1988 , Wilson and Norton, 1989 , Shugan and Desiraju, 2001 . One way in which a new advertised brand may affect the other brands is by creating confusion for consumers about which brand best fits the consumer preferences. As noted by Keller (1998, p. 464 ) "different varieties of line extensions may confuse and perhaps even frustrate consumers as to which version of the product is the 'right one' for them. As a result, they may reject new extensions for 'tried and true' favorites or allpurpose versions that claim to supersede more specialized product versions." 4 This paper addresses these issues by looking carefully at consumer preferences, pricing, product design, and the costs of communicating information on the product attributes to the potential consumers. 5
This trade-off between advertising expenditures and the fit products-consumers yields a lower optimal number of products being advertised (and, therefore, being offered for sale) than when advertising is costless. The lack of ability to perfectly target the advertising to the product that best fits each consumer results in too much overlap in advertising expenditures. Firms may then find it in their best interest to advertise a smaller number of products. The cost is that there will then be a worse fit between products and consumers, which translates in the firms being able to charge less for the products. One finds that under these conditions (less than perfect targeting) firms advertise a smaller number of products than they would if advertising were costless. This effect is greater if there is greater consumer consumer confusion about multiple advertising messages, and is smaller if the firm has a greater ability to target its advertising. Furthermore, one finds that there are circumstances where the firm chooses to offer both a specialized product targeted at only consumer segment (with a high price) and a generic product targeted at all segments (with a low price). This is because the waste of advertising from a consumer receiving multiple messages is reduced by a lower advertising level of a specialized product.
In the general problem of product line design the different products being advertised may be vertically differentiated (second degree price discrimination). In such a case one could think that the firm should advertise more the products for which it has a higher margin, the higher quality products. However, another important factor is that consumers that like quality more are still going to buy the low quality products when aware of them and not aware of the high quality products, while consumers that have a lower preference for quality will not buy the high quality products when only aware of them. That is, more consumers end up buying the low quality product than in a situation where advertising were costless, for the same product line configuration. This gives a greater incentive to advertise more the lower quality products.
In fact, if the firm wants to price discriminate between the consumers that consider both products we can find that it is optimal to advertise so that one has a greater proportion of sales of the lower quality product than when advertising were costless. In comparison to the case in which advertising is costless one then finds that the high quality product is charged a lower price while the lower quality product is offered at a higher price and higher quality.
The results of this paper are more applicable in industries where firms communicating to consumers about the product attributes is an important issue, and perfect targeting of advertising is not possible. One idea that has been previously mentioned to explain the limited number of products offered by firms is the existence of fixed costs per each product sold (see, e.g., Dixit and Stiglitz 1977, Iyer and Seetharaman 2001) . 6 Typically these fixed costs have been interpreted as production or set-up costs. The point of this paper is that because of imperfect targeting the communication about the product existence through advertising can itself generate endogenous specific costs per product through the relative convexity of advertising costs, which yields an optimal number of products to be advertised.
Product line design leading to consumer confusion can also have important implications on distribution channels as discussed in Bergen et al. (1996) . That paper argues and shows empirically that consumer confusion about product assortments can lead to more retail differentiation (because the retailers adopt different subsets of the product line), less retail price competition, more retail service and enhanced distribution. This argument may lead the manufacturer to create more confusion in the product line, in order to give greater incentives for the retailers to advertise. Also related to this work is the idea of economies of scope in building and using reputations (Wernerfelt 1988 ). The idea is that larger umbrella brands have more to lose (loss of reputation in more products) from having one product of poor quality. This could potentially be a force towards having a smaller number of brands. This paper does not look at asymmetric information with respect to product quality, and instead focuses on the communication to create consideration of the products by consumers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a parsimonious model that illustrates the interaction between product line decisions and advertising. Section 3 considers the problem of the optimal number of products. Section 4 addresses the issue of price discrimination and advertising. Section 5 concludes and discusses how firms may find ways to overcome these communication constraints.
Product Line Decisions and Advertising

Preliminaries
6 See also Karmarkar and Pitbladdo (1994) for the role of common fixed costs for several products.
In order to illustrate the issue of product line decisions with advertising consider a market where consumers can have one of two types. One type of consumers values product design A at v and values product design B at v − t. The other type of consumers values product design B at v and values product design A at v − t. Suppose that in the population of consumers these two types are equally represented, each with mass one. Furthermore, assume 2(v − t) > v so that if selling only one product and advertising were costless the firm would prefer to sell to both types of consumers.
The firm can choose to sell either product design A or product design B or both. The marginal cost of production for each product is zero. The firm cannot sell any other product designs.
In order for the consumers to consider purchasing one particular product design they have to receive advertising about it. In what follows we describe the effect of advertising in terms of consumer consideration about the products, which should be interpreted as a state such that the consumer will buy the product if the price is sufficiently low. This is not only awareness about the product but also being convinced that the product will meet the consumer preferences.
The cost of making φ A percent consumers consider product A and φ B percent consumers consider product B is C(φ A , φ B ) which is assumed symmetric, i.e., C(φ A , φ B ) = C(φ B , φ A ), ∀φ A , φ B . Note that we have 0 ≤ φ A , φ B ≤ 1. I also assume that the probability of considering buying product A and that of considering buying product B are independent. 7 Consider an advertising cost function such that there is never full consideration at the optimal communication strategy, φ i < 1, for all i. 8
If the firm chooses φ i = 0 we interpret it as the firm not selling product i. The question to be answered is then whether the firm chooses to offer the two products or just one of them.
Main Analysis
If the firm chooses p = v for both products its profit is π(v) = (φ A + φ B )v − C(φ A , φ B ). The first order condition is then φ i v = C i for i = A, B. 9 The second order conditions are just that C ii ≥ 0 and C 2 ii ≥ C 2 AB . For the remainder of the paper assume that C(·) satisfies these conditions. They just mean that there are decreasing returns to advertising expenditures, and that the cross effects are not larger than the second order own effects.
Consider now a firm charging p = v − t for both products. The profit is then
. The first order condition for product A in an interior maximum 7 The case of non-independence is briefly discussed below in Section 5. As argued there, the likely case of positive correlation reinforces the conclusion of a limited number of products.
8 The size of the market could potentially affect the advertising cost function, and therefore have an effect on the optimal advertising strategy. This issue is not explored in this paper. Note also that, as an alternative to receiving information through advertising, consumers could potentially learn about the available products through active search (Kuksov, 2003) . This possibility is not considered in this paper.
9 The term Ci represents the partial derivative of C with respect to φi. Similarly, Cij represents the second derivative of C with respect to φi and φj.
is 2(v − t)(1 − φ B ) = C A . The first order condition for product B is similar. The second order conditions for an interior maximum are C ii ≥ 0 for i = A, B, and
In particular, note that this last condition can be violated while the second order conditions for the price p = v are still satisfied. This is because for p = v − t, when advertising more than one brand the firm does not gain all the additional consideration of that product, because some of the new consumers considering any product were already considering buying the other product. This overlap of the advertising expenditures may then cause the firm to choose not to advertise one of the products. This result is stated in the following proposition.
, ∀φ B and that p = v − t for both products. Then if
then the firm chooses to advertise only one of the two products.
This result only states that if p = v − t for both products then one can have the firm only advertising one product. However, it is important to know under which conditions we can have that advertising one product is better than advertising two products and charging any price. This is presented in the following proposition.
Proposition 2: Suppose that C A (1, φ B ) > 2(v − t), ∀φ B and that condition (1) is satisfied. Then, if consumer heterogeneity is sufficiently small (small t) then the firm chooses to advertise only one of the products.
This result shows that if there is a sufficiently small consumer heterogeneity we will have just one product being advertised. The intuition is that if consumer heterogeneity is small (t is small) then, by charging a price of v − t for both products instead of a price of v when advertising both products, the firm gets greater demand with little sacrifice on the revenue per unit sold. And then by Proposition 1 we know that advertising only one product is better than advertising both products.
Note also that the greater the economies of scope in advertising, C AB < 0, the less likely we have condition (1) being satisfied. This is intuitive in the sense that greater economies of scope makes advertising both products less costly. In the limit, when advertising two products is as costly as just advertising one product we have that the optimum is obviously advertising two products.
Note that this result can be seen as showing that consumer confusion is endogenous to the product line design choice of the firm. If the firm chooses to advertise two products, it may create more consumer confusion which then requires more advertising expenditures to achieve the same level of consideration for each product. Because of this additional communication costs, the firm may end up offering only one product and therefore reducing consumer confusion. In the next subsection this issue of consumer confusion is discussed further.
This result also illustrates that the location of the product line can be affected by the communications about the products sold by the firm. In some conditions the firm decides to offer only one product, and locates the product for the preference of only one consumer segment. If we also allowed the firm to position a product between the two products targeted for each segment, we could also have that the firm, when only advertising one product, would position its product between the two products targeted to each segment and would be able to charge a price greater than v − t.
If consumer segments are not symmetric note that it could be that the firm chooses to advertise only the product for the largest segment at price v. Note also that with a slight ability to target advertising a firm may choose to advertise only the product that is most appreciated by the largest consumer segment.
For the general case of additively symmetric separable advertising cost function,
That is, the advertising cost function for each product cannot be too convex. Note that the case where the advertising cost function is constructed by using independent equal messages and only one exposure is enough for consideration (for example, as in Butters 1977) we have c(φ) = a log 1 1−φ which has the property that c (φ) = (1 − φ)c (φ), i.e., the firm is just indifferent between advertising one and two products. In this sense, in order to be optimal for the firm to advertise only one product one needs the advertising cost function to be less convex than the cost function for the case of independent equal messages.
One interesting possibility is that the cost of making a certain percentage φ of consumer consider the product is the same whether the firm advertises two products equally or advertises only one
, because if both products are advertised at φ A = φ B , the number of consumers aware of any product is 1 − (1 − φ A ) 2 . Note, however, that this does not necessarily need to hold because of potential economies of scope in advertising both products, or because consumers can become more likely to consider a product after a later advertising exposure than after an earlier one given that they are not considering the product until then. For example, denote by β(n) the probability to begin considering a product after the n-th advertising exposure given that a consumer was not considering the product at the n − 1-th exposure. Then, the probability of one consumer considering the product after n exposures is 1 − Π n j=1 (1 − β(j)). Note that if β(n) is independent of n then it is as the case of independent equal messages with one exposure being enough for consideration (Butters 1977) . If β(n) is increasing in n then we get an advertising cost function that is less convex than the case of independent equal messages, and the firm may gain more from advertising only one product. Note that having β(n) increasing in n could be derived from a threshold advertising effect where consumers need more than a certain number of advertising exposures to start considering one product.
Confusion in Advertising
One important issue in the advertising of a product line is the possible consumer confusion about the attributes of the different products in the line. One way in which this effect could be modeled is through the idea that it is more difficult to communicate the attributes of one product if the firm is also communicating the attributes of other products. Denote by A i the amount spent advertising product i. Then we could define φ i (A i , γA j ), with i = j, as the fraction of the consumers that understand the attributes of product i given that the firm spent A i advertising product i and A j advertising product j. The parameter γ, greater or equal to zero, represents the degree of confusion as seen below. Furthermore, if the firm did not advertise one product then no consumer would understand the attributes of that product, φ i (0, γA j ) = 0 ∀A j , and more advertising in one product would result in more consumers understanding the attributes of that product
Consumer confusion about the advertising messages would then be defined by
with γ ≥ 0 and ∂φ i ∂(γA j ) bounded away from zero. 10 Note then that a greater γ is associated with a greater consumer confusion, because for the same advertising expenditures, A i and A j , the fraction of consumers that become informed about the attributes of product i is smaller. Note also that a greater advertising of A j , for γ > 0, leads to a smaller fraction of consumers being informed about product i, greater consumer confusion, and this effect is greater the greater is the index of consumer confusion γ.
In terms of the notation above, note that if we invert the system of equations φ A = φ A (A A , γA B ), φ B = φ B (A B , γA A ), we get the advertising spending in each product that yield considerations φ A and φ B , A A (φ A , φ B ) and A B (φ A , φ B ), and then we have
One can then obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3: If consumer confusion is sufficiently large (large γ) and if consumer heterogeneity is sufficiently small (small t) then the firm chooses to advertise only one of the products.
The intuition is that for a large index of consumer confusion, a firm, when advertising both products, has to advertise each product very intensely to compensate for the confusion created by the advertising of the other product. Then, for large potential consumer confusion the firm may be better off advertising only one product, and not creating consumer confusion. Even with an additively separable advertising cost function one could interpret the non-existence of economies of 10 Assume that there are decreasing effects of advertising,
Note that alternatively one could have a demand side characterization of confusion having to do with an imperfection if the fit signals received by the consumers. This alternative is left for future research.
scope on the advertising cost function as the extra cost of consumer confusion about the advertising messages.
Targeting of Advertising
If the firm has the ability to target their advertising to the different consumer segments then it may reduce some of the overlap of the considerations for both products, and possibly charge higher prices. To see this consider an index of targeting ability τ such that if the firm gets 2φ i consumers considering product i, a fraction τ is fully targeted and is composed of the consumers in segment i, and a fraction (1 − τ ) is composed of consumers of segments i and j in equal proportions. 11 That is, of the 2φ i consumers considering product i, 2φ i τ + (1 − τ )φ i consumers are from segment i, and
(1 − τ )φ i consumers are from segment j. When there is no target ability, τ = 0, we get back to the case considered above. When there is maximum targeting ability, τ = 1, all adverting of product i goes to segment i.
If the firm charges the price v − t for either of the two products the profit function reduces to
. The equivalent to condition (1) can then be obtained
That is, if the targeting ability is sufficiently large, condition (1) is not satisfied and the firm is better off advertising both products (instead of only one products).
Consider now the effect of targeting ability on prices. If the firm charges the price of v for both products it gets a profit of
. Note that when τ = 1 the demand is the same as when the firm charges any other prices, and therefore this profit is greater than when the firm charges any other prices. By continuity we then have that if the targeting ability is sufficiently large the firm decides to charge higher prices, while advertising both products. That is, greater targeting ability allows a firm to charge higher prices, when both products are advertised.
An Example
In order to illustrate the results above consider the example of the quadratic and additively separable advertising costs functions, . Given the assumptions on C(φ A , φ B ) note that we have 0 < φ A = φ B < 1.
Given this cost function, condition (1) reduces to b < 2(v − t). Under this condition if the firm charges p = v − t for both products it will only advertise one product, say product A, and advertise
, and have a profit
. If condition (1) is not satisfied we have
2(v−t)+b . Under condition (1) one obtains that advertising only one product at p = v − t is better than advertising both products at p = v or p = v − t if and only if 4(v − t) 2 − 2v 2 + 4ta − a 2 > 0.
The worst case for this last condition not to be satisfied is a = v, which reduces the condition to (v − 2t) 2 > 0 which is always satisfied. That is, under condition (1), b < 2(v − t), it is always better to advertise only one product than to advertise both products at either p = v or p = v − t.
If condition (1) is violated then comparing π(v − t) with π(v) one finds that π(v − t) is greater if t is sufficiently small. For t = 0 we have
, and π(v − t) is decreasing in t.
The intuition for the effect of condition (1) on the number of products to advertise is that if the marginal costs of advertising increase very fast (high b), then the firm prefers to advertise different products in a small amount. On the other hand, if the marginal costs of advertising do not increase very fast (small b) then the firm prefers to advertise only one product and does not "waste"
advertising expenditures by making consumers consider both products.
Generic and Specialized Products
Under some conditions it may be endogenously optimal for a firm to advertise a generic product priced for all the segments and a specialized product priced only for the segment that appreciates most that product. Note that this can happen even if the two products and consumer segments are ex-ante symmetric. In order to see this consider the example above. Consider, for example, the case in which the firm prices product A, the specialized product, at p A = v and product B, the generic product, at p B = v − t. The specialized product is only bought by the consumer segment that most likes it, while the generic product is bought by either of the consumer segments. The profit for these
. From the first order conditions for an interior optimum one obtains
and the second order conditions reduce to b > v − t. Note that under the second order conditions we have that the generic product is advertised more than the specialized product, φ A < φ B , because it can attract greater demand. In order to have an interior optimum we need the second order conditions to be satisfied and
Note that there are parameter values under which an interior optimum exists in this case (advertising both products) while the interior optimum does not exist (advertising only one product) under p A = p B = v − t, which occurs under condition (1).
The optimal profit under (p A = v, p B = v − t) can then be obtained to be
We can check that for t close to zero this profit is lower than π(v − t) as stated in Proposition 2.
Consider now that condition (1) is satisfied and that (v − a) is close to
. Then if b is close to v − t we have that the profit π(v, v − t) is greater than both π(v) and π(v − t), that is, advertising a generic and a specialized product is the optimal strategy. The intuition is that if the firm advertised both products for both consumer segments (at price v − t) there would be too much overlap of the consideration of both products. The firm can then reduce the advertising of one of the products, reducing therefore the overlap of considerations, but charging a higher price for that product because there is less demand to loose from charging a higher price. From an ex-ante symmetric situation one can then obtain that the firm advertises a generic (for all consumer segments) and a specialized product (only for one of the segments). consider the optimal strategies when b increases. For b small the optimal strategy is to advertise both products at p = v because advertising is not very costly (and advertising both products at 100% consideration). When b increases then it is better to avoid the loss in the overlap of advertising both products, and only one product is advertised at p = v − t. When b increases further, optimal advertising decreases, the overlap problem becomes less serious and the firm gains from advertising at a low level an additional product at p = v while continuing to advertise the other product at p = v−t, the generic and specialized product strategy. Finally, for very high b, advertising decreases further, the overlap problem becomes even less serious, and the firm decides to advertise both products at
In Figure 2 profits for the different strategies are presented as a function of consumer heterogeneity, t, for v = 3, a = 1, b = 4.5. Consider the optimal strategies when t increases. For small consumer heterogeneity (small t), the lower price v − t is close to v and the firm advertises only one product at p = v − t. When consumer heterogeneity increases the firm advertises less because the revenue from selling a product is lower, and at some point decides to add another product advertised at p = v, the generic and specialized product strategy. When consumer heterogeneity increases further, advertising is reduced so much that the firm decides to try to sell to more consumers by advertising both products at p = v − t. Finally, when consume heterogeneity increases even further, the effect of the reduced price of higher t is so large that the firm decides to advertise both products at p = v.
The Optimal Number of Products
Consider now the question of the optimal number of products to be advertised. Suppose that the consumer preferences are uniformly distributed in a circle of length one. 13 If a consumer buys a product located at a distance x of where the consumer preferences are located the consumer gets a utility of v − tx − p, where p is price and t is a measure of consumer heterogeneity. Assume the mass of consumers to be one.
If advertising were costless the firm would choose to offer (advertise) a continuum of products, one matching each consumer preferences. 14 Because each consumer would have a perfect fit the firm could charge a price p = v. The profit being generated would be π = v.
With costly advertising (and imperfect targeting) we may expect firms to decide to advertise a finite number of products. Suppose that the firm advertises n products, i = 1, ..., n, a product i advertised to obtain consideration φ i . Assuming additive separability of advertising costs the cost of advertising the n products is then C(φ 1 , ..., φ n ) = n i=1 c(φ i ). Assume c () > 0, and c (1) high enough such that no product is advertised with consideration one.
Consider the pricing decision for sufficiently low consumer heterogeneity.
Proposition 4: Given that n products are being advertised, if the consumer heterogeneity t is sufficiently small, the optimal price of each of the n products being advertised is equal to v − t 2 .
If the consumer heterogeneity is sufficiently small the firm prefers to price such that all of its products are attractive to any consumer in the market, that is, price at v − t 2 . A higher price would lead to some loss in demand, but without much increase in revenue per unit because t is small. As shown in the proof of the Proposition a sufficient condition for t small can be written as t ≤ (v − t 2 )(1 − φ) n−1 where φ is defined by v = c (φ). When consumer heterogeneity is not too small (larger t) the firm may price such that not all consumers receiving an advertising message are willing to buy that product. That is, and as shown in the previous section, the firm may choose to offer more specialized products. Furthermore, because the potential waste of the overlap of advertising messages is reduced by advertising less some products, it may be that, as illustrated in the previous section, the firm chooses to advertise and price differently a priori equal potential products.
In order to focus on the question of the number of products, from now on let us assume sufficiently low consumer heterogeneity.
13 For the case of competition with each firm carrying one product see, for example, Grossman and Shapiro (1984) and Soberman (2001) .
14 Note that a continuum of products is not possible if there is a fixed cost of production per product.
Consider now the total demand for the n products being advertised. The mass of consumer not considering any product is Π n i=1 (1−φ i ). Then the total demand for the n products is 1−Π n i=1 (1−φ i ). The total profit from advertising n products is then π(φ 1 , ..., . Because 0 ≤ z ≤ 1 we know that the objective function above is decreasing in z. Then, the optimum φ can be obtained by min φ c(φ)/ log 1 1−φ . This can be seen as finding the efficient advertising amount given that there is overlap of the advertising messages. From these conditions one can obtain that the amount of advertising for each product is independent of the parameters of consumer heterogeneity, t, and the maximum valuation for the product, v.
Proposition 5: In an interior optimum the amount of advertising for each product is independent of t and v and is given by
This means that when we have an interior optimum all the adjustment to changes in the consumer heterogeneity or in the product valuation is done through the number of products being advertised.
Note now that the case where the advertising cost function is constructed by using independent equal messages with one exposure being enough for consideration (for example, as in Butters, 1977) we have c(φ) = a log 1 1−φ for which condition (4) is satisfied for any φ. For each φ there is an optimal number of products, n. Note that for this advertising cost function when we make φ tend to zero, the optimal number of products goes to infinity while the total expenditures in advertising remains constant. 15 Note that by perturbing the advertising cost function away from this one, one gets that (4) is not satisfied for all φ. There are some c(φ) for which condition (4) is only satisfied at φ = 0, which means that at the optimum there is an infinite number of products being advertised. A sufficient condition for φ to be strictly positive and the optimal number of products to be finite is c (0) > c (0) because the limit when φ goes to zero of the first order condition is negative under this condition, lim φ→0 c (φ) log
. For example, this condition is satisfied for c(φ) = aφ + b 1−φ and a > b. For this advertising cost function one can also obtain that the optimal advertising per product is positive and with consideration less than 100%. Finally, note that the optimal number of products is increasing in the price v − t 2 and decreasing in the optimal φ. When the revenue per unit increases the firm wants to advertise a greater number of products. When the optimal amount of advertising per product increases, the firm can reach a similar number of consumers by advertising a smaller number of products. Because the optimal amount of advertising per product is decreasing in the convexity of the advertising cost function, the optimal number of products decreases with lower convexity of the advertising cost function.
Price Discrimination and Advertising
Another important issue to consider is that when firms sell vertically differentiated products they may want to change the product design because of advertising considerations. Moreover, in such a setting it may be important to understand which factors determine which products are advertised more intensely. Suppose that consumers have net utility, U = V (θ, q) − p, where θ determines the relative preference for quality, q represents quality (or quantity), and p is price. Assume V q > 0, consumers like products with greater quality, 16 V (θ, 0) = 0, the gross utility of a product of zero quality is zero, V θq > 0, consumers with greater θ have a greater marginal utility for quality, and V< 0, consumers have a decreasing marginal utility for quality. Suppose that there are two type of consumers, θ 1 and θ 2 , with θ 2 > θ 1 , and with proportions N 1 and N 2 , respectively (N 1 + N 2 = 1).
Each consumer has private information on θ but the firm can offer different products for consumers to self-select as in Mussa and Rosen (1978) or Moorthy (1984) . 17 Denote product i as the product targeted at the θ i consumers, with i = 1, 2. Producing one unit of product of quality q has a cost of gq. 18 Suppose also that consumers are initially not considering buying any of the two products but can be made to consider either of the products through advertising by the firm. Denote the chosen consideration for product i as φ i which can be achieved at cost c(φ i ). Suppose for now that the θ 1 consumers never buy product 2, even when only considering that product, and that the firm wants the θ 2 consumers to buy product 2 when aware of both products. 19 If consumers have both products in their consideration set they will buy the product targeted to their type. This yields the standard incentive compatibility (IC) and individual rationality (IR) constraints (presented in the Appendix). The proportion of consumers that has both products in 16 The term Fx means partial derivative of F with respect to x. 17 See also Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr (1999) and Desai (2001) for the case of selling a product line under competition, or Villas-Boas (1998) for the case of a distribution channel. In a different setting, Shugan (1989) also considers the question of the optimal product line in an oligopoly where firms are vertically differentiated.
18 Similar results can be obtained by assuming that the unit cost of a product is convex in quality. 19 The cases where θ1 consumers may buy product 2 and where θ2 consumers only buy product 2 when only aware of that product are discussed below. their consideration set is φ 1 φ 2 . Note that any type of consumer considering only product 1 will buy that product because for type 1 this is guaranteed by its IR constraint, and for type 2 this is implied by the IR constraint for type 1 and V θ > 0. The proportion of consumers considering only product 1 is φ 1 (1 − φ 2 ).
By assumption for this case, only the θ 2 consumers buy if consumers consider only product 2.
This means that V (θ 1 , q 2 ) − p 2 < 0. The proportion of consumers that consider only product 2 is φ 2 (1 − φ 1 ) . Because of the IC for type 2, the IR for type 1, and V θ > 0, we know that the IR for type 2 is not binding. Furthermore, because we assumed V (θ 1 , q 2 ) − p 2 < 0, we have that the IC for type 1 is not binding. We will have the IR for type 1 binding because otherwise the firm would gain from increasing p 1 , and the IC for type 2 binding because otherwise the firm would gain from increasing p 2 . These binding constraints are exactly as in the traditional second-degree price discrimination problem with costless advertising (Mussa and Rosen, 1978) . Substituting for the binding constraints we have p 1 = V (θ 1 , q 1 ) and p 2 = V (θ 2 , q 2 ) − V (θ 2 , q 1 ) + V (θ 1 , q 1 ). One can then use these expressions to rewrite the problem of the firm (presented in Appendix). Note that because the firm is choosing both advertising and product qualities, it is irrelevant if these are chosen sequentially or simultaneously. The first order conditions with respect to q 1 and q 2 then yield
Note that the optimal q 2 is the efficient one, such that the marginal utility is equal to the marginal cost of quality. Furthermore, by (6), the optimal quality for the lower quality product, q 1 , is distorted downwards and is less than the efficient one. These results are as in the traditional case with costless advertising (Mussa and Rosen, 1978) . More interestingly, from (6), the distortion on q 1 is greater the more the firm advertises the high quality product and the less the firm advertises the lower quality product. Therefore, note that when one increases the advertising expenditures on the lower quality product or decreases the advertising expenditures on the higher quality product, we have that the margin of the lower quality product, V (θ 1 , q 1 ) − gq 1 , is increased, and the margin of the higher quality product,
Consider now the first order conditions with respect to the advertising intensities of both products, φ 1 and φ 2 . In order to simplify notation denote the margins of both products as respectively,
The second order conditions of this problem given m 1 and m 2 are satisfied if c (φ) > m 1 N 2 , ∀φ, which is assumed. If the function c() is not too convex, low c (), then the second order conditions will not be satisfied and we end up in the same case as in Proposition 2 above, and the firm chooses to advertise only one product. If there is little consumer heterogeneity, θ 1 close to θ 2 , that product is priced to be attractive to both consumer segments.
From (7) one can obtain φ 2 =
which we can substitute in (8) to obtain N 2 m 2 −
). Totally differentiating this equation with respect to φ 1 and each m i one obtains that advertising to the lower quality product, φ 1 , is increasing in the margin of that product and decreasing in the margin of the higher quality product. Similarly, one can obtain that advertising to the higher quality product is increasing in the margin of the higher quality product and decreasing in the margin of the lower quality product.
Subtracting (7) from (8) one obtains c (
where φ 12 is a number between φ 1 and φ 2 .
Noting that by the assumption on the second order conditions, c (φ 12 ) > m 1 N 2 , and we then have the following results on which product should be advertised more intensely.
Proposition 6: The lower quality product should be advertised more intensely if and only if m 1 > N 2 m 2 .
This result shows that which product is more advertised depends on the size of its margin, and on the size of the high type segment. Interestingly, the product with the lower margin, the lower quality product, can be advertised more intensely. For example, if the margins are not too different the firm chooses to advertise more the lower quality product. The intuition for this result is that the consumers that appreciate more quality will also buy the lower quality product when only considering that product, while the consumers that appreciate quality less do not buy the higher quality product if only considering that product. That is, the low quality product is also sold to the consumers that appreciate quality more, while the high quality product is never sold to the consumers that appreciate quality less. This gives a greater incentive to advertise the lower quality product. Note that the condition in the proposition will occur when θ 2 − θ 1 is small enough.
Comparing the incentives to distort the lower quality product with the case in which advertising is costless, one finds that if the consumer preferences across consumers are not too different then costly advertising causes the quality of the lower quality product to be less distorted.
Proposition 7: If m 1 > N 2 m 2 then costly advertising causes the quality of the lower quality product to be less distorted from the efficient one in comparison to the case in which advertising is costless.
This proposition then implies that with costly advertising if the consumer preferences are relatively similar then the firm gets a greater margin from the lower quality product and lowers the price of the higher quality product in comparison to the case of costless advertising. Note that even if m 1 < N 2 m 2 one may still get less quality distortion under costly advertising than under costless advertising. In order to solve for the optimum one has to consider (5), (6), (7), and (8) together.
One can then can obtain comparative statics on the proportion of consumers that have a higher preference for quality and on the similarity of consumer preferences.
Proposition 8: Consider c (.) large. Then the margin and the advertising intensity on the lower quality product, m 1 and φ 1 respectively, are decreasing in the proportion of consumers that have a higher preference for quality, N 2 . Similarly, the margin and the advertising intensity on the higher quality product, m 2 and φ 2 respectively, are increasing in N 2 .
This proposition just gets the expected result that when the proportion of consumers that most appreciates quality increases the firm distorts more the lower quality product, generating a lower margin for the lower quality product and a higher margin for the higher quality product. At the same time the firm decreases advertising to the lower quality product and increases advertising to the higher quality product.
Suppose now that the firm decides to offer a product such the θ 1 consumers may also buy product 2. This means that V (θ 1 , q 2 ) − p 2 ≥ 0. It can then be seen that at the optimum p 2 = V (θ 1 , q 2 ) which yields that the optimal q 1 and q 2 are determined by V q (θ 1 , q) = g, that is, q 1 = q 2 and p 1 = p 2 . This means that the firm decides to offer only one product. This will happen when the proportion of θ 2 consumers, N 2 , is high and θ 1 is close to θ 2 . This case is a particular case of the firm's problem above.
Finally, another possibility is that the firm chooses to offer product 2 at a price so that the θ 2 consumers only buy that product when aware of product 2 and unaware of product 1. In this case the firm would not need to worry about the IC constraint for type 2 and would charge p 2 = V (θ 2 , q 2 ).
The quality levels being offered would then be the efficient ones, V q (θ i , q i ) = g, and the margins m 1 and m 2 would be at the maximum possible. Note that this can be potentially optimal if the increase in the margins has a bigger effect than the transfer of demand from the high quality product to the low quality product which is φ 1 φ 2 N 2 . This can be the case if φ 1 , φ 2 , or N 2 are small, or if θ 2 is much higher than θ 1 .
Discussion and Concluding Remarks
This paper models the firms' costs of communicating to consumers the existence of their products and the influence of these costs on the optimal design of the product line. In particular, one finds that under some general advertising cost functions a firm may choose to offer a smaller number of products than the number of different consumer preferences in the market. The intuition for this result is that by advertising several products a firm is going to have some consumers consider more than one of these products, while buying only one of them. This overlap of considerations creates a greater cost in advertising expenditures that is reduced when the firm advertises a smaller number of products.
The firm has to trade-off this effect against offering less fit between different consumer preferences and the products being offered, which is translated in lower prices. This trade-off then determines the optimal number of products to be advertised or sold. Note also that if advertising messages by a firm for its different products are positively correlated across consumers, then the results in the paper of a limited number of products being advertised would be strengthened, because there would be greater overlap of the considerations of different products.
There are, however, some techniques that firms can use to solve this problem of overlap of advertising effects. As noted above, better advertising targeting may allow a firm to target each advertising message to the intended audience, therefore reducing the overlap and consumer confusion.
Improvements on the profiling of the audience for different types of media allow firms to better manage the overlap and confusion of advertising, and therefore allow firms to offer a longer product line that better fits the different consumer preferences.
Another technique that firms can use to deal with the overlap and consumer confusion issue is to offer a relatively few base models together with a range of options to allow customers to tailor products to their needs. The description of the options can be communicated through a sales force after the customers understand well their preferences with respect to the base models. While understanding their preferences with respect to the base models, customers are aware that they will be able to choose among more detailed options within each base model. The automobile industry can be seen as a good example of this technique at work, with the dealers offering detailed information on the different options.
Providing comparisons in a single advertisement may also allow firms to make customers aware of the products sold by the firm and their different features. Finally, the price level and the amount of advertising could also serve a signaling role to reveal the horizontal and/or vertical differentiation between products.
Note also that the preference for a product could also be a function of the products being offered in the market (e.g., Wernerfelt, 1995) . This is a potentially interesting issue that should be looked at in future research as well as its potential interactions with the communication strategies. In this paper this issue is only being included through the consumers having or not having a preference for a certain product (whether or not that product is being considered by the consumers) and by the communication costs of having a product or products being considered by the consumers.
In a setting where vertically differentiated products are offered in order to self-select different types of consumers one obtains that because the binding incentive compatibility constraint is for consumers that value quality more not to buy the lower quality products then advertising costs generate less distortion of the lower quality product. This is because consumers that value quality less only buy the lower quality product, while consumers that value quality more have a positive surplus from buying any product. This brings the actual proportion of consumers buying the lower quality product to be higher than when advertising is costless. This also yields a force for a firm to advertise more its lower quality product.
Technical Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Because C A (1, φ B ) > 2(v − t), ∀φ B we know that at the optimum φ A < 1. Similarly, because of symmetry of C(·) we have φ B < 1. Then, because of condition (1) we know that an interior optimum does not exist, which means that φ i = 0 for one i. QED
Proof of Proposition 2:
The case of p = v − t and advertising two products is already ruled out by Proposition 1. Therefore, we only need now to worry about the cases of advertising two products with at least one of them being charged the price p = v. Consider first the case where both products are priced at p = v. Define φ * A and φ * B as the advertising levels satisfying the first order conditions for the case where p = v. Then, the profit for p = v is π(v) = v(φ * A + φ * B ) − C(φ * A , φ * B ) which for t close to zero is strictly smaller than the profit under
Now, because by Proposition 1 we know that the profit for p = v − t under (φ * A , φ * B ) is smaller than the optimum profit for p = v − t under condition (1) (which means only advertising one product), we have that advertising only product is better than the highest profit under p = v.
Consider now the case where one product is charged at p = v (say product A) and the other product is charged at p = v − t (say product B). Define φ A and φ B as the advertising levels satisfying the first order conditions for this case. Then, the profit for these prices is π(v, v − t) = v φ A + (v − t)(2 φ B − φ A φ B ) − C( φ A , φ B ) which for t close to zero is strictly smaller that the profit under p A = p B = v − t for ( φ A , φ B ) because 2( φ A + φ B − φ A φ B ) > φ A + 2 φ B − φ A φ B . Now, using Proposition 1, we have that advertising both products and charging p A = v and p B = v − t is dominated by advertising only one product. QED Proof of Proposition 3: Because t is small the firm prefers to charge a price v−t for the products it advertises because it gets a greater demand. If the firm only advertises one product the profit can be written as max A i 2(v−t)φ i (A i , 0)−A i , which is independent of γ. If the firm advertises both products the profit is max ∂(γA j ) is assumed bounded away from zero then as long as either A A or A B is not close to zero, the derivative of the profit is also bounded away from zero. Then, if either A A or A B is not close to zero, if γ is sufficiently large the profit of advertising only one product is greater than the profit of advertising both products.
Finally, if both A A and A B go to zero when γ increases, then the profit of advertising both products goes to zero which is less than the profit of advertising only one product. QED Proof of Proposition 4: Consider the price for one product i, p i . If p i > v− t 2 then 2 v−p i 2t φ i Π j =i (1− φ j ) is the demand from the consumers that consider firm i and do not consider any other firm. By cutting the price to p i − dp the firm loses something less than φ i dp because of lower margins (because the maximum potential demand for product i is φ i ) and gains at least p i 1 t φ i Π j =i (1 − φ j )dp because of greater demand. Because the maximum a firm would advertise for a product would be smaller than φ defined by v = c (φ) (given that this is the case with the maximum possible price, and the maximum marginal payoff for more advertising), the gain from cutting prices is greater than the loss if t ≤ (v − t 2 )(1 − φ) n−1 , given that the firm never gains from having a product with a price below v − t 2 . That is, if t is sufficiently small then the gain is greater than the loss, and the firm is better off undercutting p i . Finally, as argued above, if p i < v − t 2 the firm can increase this price slightly without losing any demand and therefore raising revenue. QED
Incentive Compatibility and Individual Rational Constraints in Price Discrimination
Case:
V (θ 2 , q 2 ) − p 2 ≥ V (θ 2 , q 1 ) − p 1 (10)
Problem for the Firm in Price Discrimination Case: The maximization over q 1 then yields that m 1 decreases in N 2 while m 2 increases in N 2 . Substituting into φ 1 and φ 2 one gets that φ 1 is decreasing and φ 2 is increasing in N 2 . QED v,v-t) π (v,v-t) 
